Jeremy Dolan - 30/11/2012 at 4 pm

Our next speaker will be Jeremy Dolan. Jeremy is a fourth-year Ph.D. student in philosophy at New York University, being advised by Ned Block. He is visiting the Institut Jean Nicod this semester.

Title: "Apparent size and shape in visual experience"
Date, Time, Place: 30/11/2012, 4pm, Salle de Réunion du Pavillon Jardin

Abstract: Does a distant tree look smaller than an equally-sized tree that is closer to you? Does the shape of a table seem to change as you look at it from different points of view? Many theories of perception accept the “appearance view,” according to which perceptual experience involves an awareness of “appearances.” On such a theory, we experience a tree’s apparent size changing as we move closer to it and a table’s apparent shape changing as we change vantage points. I will discuss two perceptual phenomena which motivate the appearance view, and I will offer a simpler explanation of them which doesn’t require that we posit “appearances.” Drawing on lessons from perceptual constancies, visual illusions, multi-stable stimuli, and the reflections of artists, I will propose a theory of shape and size perception which retains the common sense view that when we see an object—unless things go awry—the only shape we perceive is the shape that the object actually has.

Luca Barlassina - 16/11/2012 at 4:30 pm

Our next speaker will be Luca Barlassina (Ruhr University Bochum). Luca was a visiting fellow at the Institut Jean Nicod 2 years ago, and he is now a Von Humboldt Post-Doctoral Fellow at Bochum University. He will talk about a paper he wrote with Albert Newen (Ruhr University Bochum).

Title: "The role of bodily perception in emotion: In defense of an impure somatic theory"
Date, Time, Place: 16/11/2012, 4:30pm, Salle de Réunion du Pavillon Jardin

Abstract: In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz’s (2004) neo-Jamesian pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz’s theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems―i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn’t able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren’t emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.

Reference
Prinz J. (2004), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.

Radu Umbres - 09/11/2012 at 4 pm

Our next speaker will be Radu Umbres (Institut Jean Nicod). Radu received his PhD from University College London and he is now a post-doc fellow at the Institute.

Title: Paper-stretchers, Fallopian tubes and dahus. Epistemic vigilance and the social mechanisms of mirthful deception
Date, Time, Place: 09/11/2012, 4pm, Salle de Réunion du Pavillon Jardin

Abstract: This paper analyses the “fool’s errand”, a type of practical joke which occurs across different societies and institutional settings in which “victims” are tricked into perform patently absurd actions. I discuss several instances of this prank found in my ethnography of Romanian villagers as well as described in literature. This paper argues that these variants share an elaborate mode of deception which can be explained by the intersection of a cognitive mechanism in human communication proposed by Dan Sperber and his colleagues (Sperber et al. 2010) with a specific structure of competence and authority attached to social roles. The success of “fool’s errands” is comes from a particular vulnerability of human cognition to form mental representations in the absence of full comprehension of utterances when the speaker is seemingly competent and trustworthy. The prank exploits the override of epistemic vigilance towards the (nonsensical) content of utterances by (misplaced yet reasonable) epistemic trust in the source of information. The paper also discusses similarities and differences between reported forms of the “fool's errand” as well as the success of it s social reproduction, by analysing the social structures wherein the prank is embedded. Finally, I address the theoretical relevance of a study of “fool's errand” in comparison with classical anthropological approaches to rites of passage and institutionalised mirth.

Reference
Sperber, D. et al., 2010. Epistemic vigilance. Mind and Language, 25(4), pp.359–393.