Anna Drozdzowicz – 2014/06/20

Date: 20^th of June

Time: 11:30 am

Place: Conference room, Pavillon Jardin - 29, rue d'Ulm - 75 005 Paris

Speaker: Anna Drozdzowicz (Univ. of Oslo)

Title: “The nature of linguistic intuitions about utterance content”

Abstract: The talk provides a theoretical framework for one type of linguistic intuitions – intuitions (and judgements) about whether certain linguistic expression could be used or is used to mean such-and-such, which I call here judgments about utterance content. Such judgements are specially relevant to many debates in philosophy of language and linguistics, as they constitute a potentially important source of evidence for speaker meaning. The strategy is not an innocent one (Bach, 2002) and the reliability of such reflective judgements cannot be taken as a brute fact (Higginbotham, 2000). I provide an account of basic features and the scope of judgements about utterance content. I argue that they do not provide evidence about literal meaning and that they cover both strongly and weakly communicated content (contra Azzouni, 2013). For the rest part of my talk I discuss the question of what might be a plausible mechanism responsible for delivery of judgements about utterance content. I finish with raising several issues concerning their utility for different research programmes at the semantics/ pragmatics interface.

Eric Mandelbaum - 2014/06/13

Date: 13^th of June

Time: 11:30 am

Place: Conference room, Pavillon Jardin - 29, rue d'Ulm - 75 005 Paris

Speaker: Eric Mandelbaum (Harvard Univ.)

Title: “Fragmentation of Thought and the Web of Belief.”

Abstract: At least since Quine, it has been thought that beliefs are stored in a web-like structure. The web of belief model has three main commitments: that all the beliefs one has are synchronically causally related; that the beliefs in the center of the web correspond to the necessary truths, while contingent truths are housed at the periphery; and that strength of belief is a function of how centrally stored the belief is. However, this view is generally supported on epistemological, not psychological, grounds. The cognitive science of belief appears to falsify all three Quinean commitments. In this talk, I’ll discuss how a psychofunctional theory of belief reformulates our models of belief storage and updating.

Emmanuel de Vienne - 2014/06/06 – 11:30 am

Date: 6^th of June

Time: 11:30 am

Place: Conference room, Pavillon Jardin - 29, rue d'Ulm - 75 005 Paris

Speaker: Emmanuel de Vienne (Nanterre Univ.)

Title: “How could one be a perspectivist? Language socialization and spirit categorization among the Trumai Indians (Mato Grosso, Brazil).”

Abstract: Philippe Descola’s animism, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism are two dominant analytical concepts in the ethnology of Lowland South America. I will argue that these so-called “ontological” approaches tend to underestimate other interesting phenomena such as the contextual and interpersonal variations of ontological discourses, the categorization and detection procedures of supernatural beings, the emotional dimension of spirit encounters, and the ways this knowledge is transmitted to children. Through the ethnography of the denetsak, the main figures of Trumai cosmology, this presentation will try to fill this gap and shed new light on the epistemological status of animism and perspectivism. In so doing, my intent is also to discuss important aspects of religious cognition, pragmatics and emotional cognition.